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Without Distinction: Testing Realist
Theory with the International
Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination
John Mahler

Abstract
This article tests realist theory using a case study on the International Convention on
the Elimination ojAll Forms ofRacial Discrimination. It provides a briefoverview ofrealism
and gives four hypotheses about how anti-discrimination law is consistent with realist ideas:
1) states form andjoin the ICERD, 2) the convention will allow a noncommittal membership,
3) enforcement is conditional on state involvement and agreement, and 4) ICERD has a
limited ability to change structures. Using qualitative evidence from the writings ofICERD
and the reaction 0.( various states to treaty provisions, the article shows that ICERD is a
relatively weak bodv, yet it has still influenced national laws and state actions. While fidl
compliance to the convention may never be attainable, ICERD has been partially successful
in helping the UN/ii/fill its mandate. The test has produced mixed results on how well realist
theory describes the origination, development, and implementation of ICERD.
Introduction
Suppose ... that there were some ... distinction made between men upon account of their
different ... fea.tures, so that those who have black hair ... or grey eyes should not enjoy
the same privileges as other citizens; can it be doubted but these persons, ... united together
by one common persecution, would be as dangerous to the magistrate as any others that
had associated themselves merely upon the account of religion? ... There is only one thing
which gathers people into seditious commotions, and that is oppression ..
-John Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration
John Locke wrote more than three hundred years ago about how distinguishing someone
based on hair or eye color would be dangerous. Since John Locke's time, much has been done to
propagate intolerance, promote tolerance, and combat discrimination, whether that discrimination
is based on religion, race, or some other method for classifying humanity. International action
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has been coupled with national action against discrimination as international organizations such
as the United Nations (UN) have become more involved in interstate relations and even domestic
affairs. The primary instrument combating racial discrimination is the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).
ICERD was opened for signature and ratification on 21 December 1965 and entered into
force approximately three years later on 4 January 1969 (UN GA Resolution 2106). Since
then, many states have become party to the convention, and the Committee on Elimination
of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has worked actively with states' parties to implement laws
against racial discrimination.
The development of anti-discrimination law in the internatiohal arena otTers an
interesting case to test the realist theory in political science. To formally test the theory. I
will first provide a brief overview of realism and give hypotheses about anti-discrimination
law consistent with realist ideas; these hypotheses will then form the structure for the
paper. Each section will include qualitative evidence from ICERD's writings and work. the
reaction of various states, and the interaction of the committee and states' parties for the
implementation of treaty provisions.

Realism
In the fifth chapter of the Twenty Years Crisis, E.H. Carr established the basic tenets of
realist thought. Realism attempts to explain the world not in terms of moral absolutes but in the
actions of imperfect people. Carr established threc foundations of realist theory. First, history
is a series of causes and effects that may be understood through analysis. Second, theories do
not exist independently of reality. Third, "morality is a product of power." In other words,
without central authority there can be no right or wrong; there is no such thing as a natural
right, because no such rights exist independently of power. I
Realism has changed since Carr wrote his book. In addition to these foundational
principles, realists such as Hans 1. Morgenthau and Kenneth N. Waltz focused on "the limits
imposed on states by the international distribution of material resources" (Legro and Moravcsik
1999,6). Waltz has written clearly and indefatigably on structural realism. The following is
a list of vital points extracted from his "Structural Realism After the Cold War" and "The
Emerging Structure of International Politics":
International politics operate among self-interested, security-minded states. Also. states
must maintain internal security while keeping a close eye on world developments in
order to maintain power (2000.6, 37).
• States compete for wealth as well as power and will watch the development of other
countries closely for signs of changes in the power structure. Thus. states may seek a
greater role in international organizations as a road to power (2000,33-4).
• States have at least two options in the international structure: balancing or bandwagoning;
bandwagoning is often easier. though perhaps not as effective (2000. 38).
International relations are dominated by the bipolar structure of the Cold War (2000.
39). Also, the bipolarity of the Cold War system predicts that the Soviet Union and the
United States would act similarly (1993, 46). This manifests itself in the convention
on at least two occasions; the inclusion of anti-Semitism and the denial of the need
•
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to vastly change laws. The Soviet excuse was no discrimination; the U.S. excuse was
protecting other rights.
• "[Uncertainty) about the future does not make cooperation and institution building
among nations impossible; [it does) strongly condition their operation and limit their
accomplishment;" thus, dramatic shifts in structure are highly unlikely (2000, 41).
• With the end of the Cold War, the world disarmed to a degree rather quickly; however,
"leaders saw that without ... constructive efforts the world would not become one
in which [people) could safely and comfortably live" (1993, 55). This idea may be
applicable during Cold War times, as well.
I derived four hypotheses from this list. First, realists predict that states hesitate to join a
convention unless a compelling security concern existed; however, states may see participation
as a method to interact with other states and consolidate power, or states may relish the
opportunity to jump on the bandwagon. In ICERD's formation, it is likely that the U.S. and
the Soviet Union would play significant roles. Second, realists hold that states would agree on
only a noncommittal treaty, allowing themselves to pull out should compliance become too
costly. Third, the strength of the enforcement mechanism would be conditional on the strength
and involvement of states' parties. Thus, ICERD should have little power independently and
would have a weak enforcement mechanism. Finally, ICERD would not dramatically change
either internal or external affairs, and its accomplishments would be limited.

Hypothesis 1: States Forming and Joining ICERD
The first hypothesis is that states would hesitate to join a convention unless a compelling
security concern existed; however, states may see participation as a means to interact with
other states and consolidate power, or states may simply jump on the bandwagon.
ICERD arrived after a series of declarations and conventions prohibiting racial discrimination. The Charter of the United Nations declared "human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion" (UN Charter). The most
important body for law on racial discrimination within the UN was the Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. This was established by the Commission on Human Rights in 1947, "to undertake studies, particularly in the light of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and to make recommendations to the Commission on Human
Rights concerning the prevention of discrimination of any kind" (Santa Cruz 1977,35). Notably,
there already existed two conventions concerning discrimination in employment and education discrimination. The UN was not treading on new ground; it was merely expanding the
already existing body of human rights treaties.
The sub-commission's work received a higher place on the agenda during the winter
of 1959; this will sound commonsensical, but ICERD would arguably never have come into
being without acts of negative discrimination. In West Germany and other places around the
world, certain groups had attacked Jewish sites. This anti-Semitism alarmed the international
community (Banton 1996,53). Others referred to this as an "epidemic of swastika-painting and
other forms of racial and national hatred and religious and racial prejudices ofa similar nature."
The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities happened
to be in session in January of that year and condemned the acts, later composing factual data to
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for analysis. It recommended an instrument to "impose specific legal obligations on the parties
to prohibit manifestations of racial and national hatreds" (Schwelb 1966. 997-R).
The idea that discrimination is reproachable can be traced at least as far back as the
Enlightenment. This paper began with a quote from Locke that discussed mostly religious
intolerance but touched on what might be called racial intolerance as well. The dissemination
of these ideas led various governments to condemn and outlaw slavery. Then. the victors of
World War I imposed various standards for how the nations carved out ofthe Austro-Hungarian
Empire should treat minorities.
During World War II, Nazi Germany showed that racial discrimination begins with
exclusion and ends in extermination. Genocide became a crime, and the international
community realized that discrimination is the seed for it. Anti-Semitic acts. then. performed
so elose to the end of the war, told the world that discrimination would not just disappear;
people of their own accord would not give up these potent ideas, and members of the
United Nations realized that there ought to be national laws prohibiting some or all forms
of racial discrimination. Future conflict could destabilize the postwar system. and states saw
international action against racial discrimination as a means to prevent future conflict. Thus.
the introduction of the treaty to the agenda is in linc with realist predictions about sccurity.
In fact. ICERD's preface uscd both the word "security" and thc phrase "all necessary
means." That racial discrimination and mistreatment of minorities has been a kcy propagator of
conflict has been affirmed by various conflicts during both world wars and time and again over
the last half century. ICERD offers valuable help and advice for responsible states attempting
to deal with these problems.
One author warned that states should be acutely aware of the social costs of racial
discrimination in all fonns, in private as well as public settings (Mcron 19R5, 294). The social
exclusion of a group may lead to political unrest. extremism, and riots; often those without
political means of redress consider violence as the next best option. Considering such costs.
states would wisely make anti-discrimination law a matter of national security.
After the postwar acts of anti-Semitism, African states in the UN General Assembly
(GA) demanded a convention. Some in the GA wanted a convention that considered both
racial and religious discrimination (Banton 1996, 54). Apparently, Arab state delegates did
not want a mention of religion in the convention because of the nature of the Arab-Israeli
conflict. Eastern Europe did not consider religion as important as race. Schwelb argued that
"political undercurrents" favored the racial question, and states agreed to make a convention
considering religious discrimination separately (1966. 999). Interestingly. it does not appear
that the stronger, more powerful Western states were responsible for the initial push for the
convention; however, smaller states' action openly is to some degree a sign of attempts to take
a greater position on the international stage.
Schwelb mentioned that most states did not want the convention to be an organ of the UN.
wanting instead states' parties to be accountable only to one another (1966, 1035). As a largely
independent organ, the convention is like a horizontal self-help organization, like Alcoholics
Anonymous, where people willingly subject themselves to a kind of monitoring with an eye
on the potential benefits of membership and a desire to change. Pressurc from other states that
join may convince a state that to remain influential in the international community, it must
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adopt international nonns; jumping on the bandwagon enthusiastically may win friends.
While the theoretical links are logical, the extent to which states were in fact motivated
by security concerns is unclear. Banton argued that many states did not really understand
racial discrimination as defined by the convention (1996). The treaty itself looks at racial
discrimination as a crime, but many states referred to it instead as a sickness; this definition
implies no one is held responsible. The Soviets, believing they had created a perfect socialist
society, believed racism to be a natural extension of capitalism and imperialism. Also, former
colonies spoke against colonialism, believing they had suffered from discrimination but would
not need to act against it in their own states. Perhaps states saw the convention as a way to
get back at capitalists and former colonial masters without imposing any great obligations on
themselves. There is some evidence of this as some states have later refused to make great
adjustments in national laws and deny the existence of discrimination in their countries.
In fact, only the United Kingdom is mentioned as publicly admitting discrimination. States
like the UK held that racial discrimination would exist anywhere race was a distinction; laws
might limit its effects, but the discrimination would always exist (Banton 1996, 58-9). The UK
also held a unique view on another related point. Instead of using the phrase, "prohibit and bring
to an end" [ICERD Article 2 (1 d)], it wanted to say, "with the purpose of bringing to an end." The
Netherlands and Turkey proposed a mild compromise, and Ghana offered the phrase "required
by circumstances." Apparently, some countries believed this phrase meant that states would be
exempt from enacting new laws if no discrimination existed (Schwelb 1966, 1017).
It is arguable, then, that there was no consensus on the nature of discrimination and the
expectations for states' parties. One of Banton's most important insights was as follows:
"The belief that racial discrimination could be eliminated ... mobilized governments in pursuit
of a higher objective ... without [which] they would never have committed themselves as they
did" (1996, 50). Some evidence supports that states thought they could sign the convention
and not change any national laws; however, most states did understand the treaty and the
concept of discrimination; "the travaux prcparatoires reveal that governments were well aware
of the far-reaching and mandatory nature of [the convention]" (Mahalic and Mahalic 1987,
88). Schwelb concurred, saying that many newly independent states participated actively and
significantly in the convention (1966, 1057). To summarize, this evidence suggests that states
were involved in the convention formation, but many did not intend to change national laws.
If states anticipated great security benefits, the benefits would have had to come from changes
in other countries and not in their own states. Arguably, though, the great powers knew about
the potential security'benefits, or suggestions by smaller states for the convention would never
have been seriously considered.
Realist predictions about the polarity of the debate are difficult to determine; realists predict
that U.S. and Soviet camps would arise. One example illustrates the alignment on one issue.
The U.S. and Brazil together proposed that a specific mention of anti-Semitism be included
in the convention (Banton 1996,60-61), and Austria, Poland, and Ecuador agreed. There was
some disagreement about whether anti-Semitism qualified as racial or religious discrimination.
The Afro-Asian delegates held that the convention already covered anti-Semitism and that no
mention was neccssary (Greece, France, Sudan, Jamaica, Italy, Nigeria, Pakistan, Lebanon,
iran, India, Jordan, Trinidad and Tobago, Zambia, Panama, Ecuador, Uganda, Ethiopia, and
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Guatemala agreed). Belgium thought leaving out anti-Semitism somehow limited the treaty.
There was a general agreement that anti-Semitism did fall under the deflnition of racial, not
just religious, discrimination, because even non-practicing Jews experienced it. The USSR
agreed that anti-Semitism was a fonn of racial discrimination (Schwelb 1966, 1014). Again.
this agreement is not consistent with realist predictions about polarity but may be consistent
with a prediction that the U.S. and the Soviet Union may behave similarly.
To conclude this section, it seems that the majority of statcs were not overly concerned
about security, though many states participated enthusiastically, as if to gain power or to jump
on the bandwagon. The bipolar nature of the debate is difficult to detennine. though the fact
that the convention passed a unanimous vote docs not seem to coincide with this hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2: Convention Will Allow Noncommittal Membership
Realists hold states would want to remain relatively noncommitted to a treaty, allowing
themselves to pull out should compliance become too costly. Language in the treaty would
be vague, with standards difficult to measure and easy to avoid. Perhaps the best test for this
comes in Article (4). The reaction of states to this burdensome demand will provide useful
infonnation for the test of realism.
The U.S. and other Western states expressed concern about Article (4b), which called for
state's parties to "prohibit organizations which incite discrimination and make participation in
them punishable by law." The West saw potential conflicts with freedoms of association and
speech, though it chose not to pursue the debate and counted on being able to make reservations
(Banton 1996,62). The Third Committee omitted the part about reservations by a small number
of votes, but the General Assembly put it back into the convention. Schwelb commented "the
[resulting] provision is rather liberal and goes far in the direction of flexibility in the matter of
reservations" (1966, 1055-6). Schwelb also called ICERD a maximalist document; the goals.
aims, and speeiflcations could lead to drastic changes, but the lenient reservations would allow
the West to become a part of the treaty (1058) and likely limit its impact.
Many states have indeed made reservations. The U.S. delegate said the following when
voting for the convention: 2
Here in this Assembly I wish to state that the United States understands Article 4 of the
convention as imposing no obligation on any party to take measures which are not fully
consistent with its constitutional guarantees of freedom, including freedom of speech
and association. This interpretation is entirely consistent with the opening paragraph of
Article 4 of the convention itself, which provides that in carrying out certain obligations
of the convention, States Parties shall have due regard to the principles embodied in the
UNDHR and the rights expressly set forth in Article 5. 3
-American Journal oj1nternational LOll'
The UK tended to agree that Article (4) was impossible to implement (Sehwelb 1966,
1025). ICERD, however, has emphasized the need to eliminate not only acts of discrimination
but also the roots of discrimination, namely "prejudices and objective socio-economic
conditions." This is the likely objective of Article (4), which requires the criminalization of the
act of spreading racist ideas. Part of the problem with this is that an act not subversive to U.S.
law and order may be quite dangerous in another country without the same legal and social
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controls and nonns (Meron 1985,297-9). Apparently, some Western states have defended the
rights to freedom of speech and association over the right to not be discriminated against.
Since the convention entered into force, debate about these rights has continued among
committee homes. The positions of significant actors are outlined below (Meron 1985, 30 I):
UK: Article (4) dissemination clauses should be carried only out with full respect for
rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Belgium: Laws must be in full compliance with Article (4), while at the same time
allowing freedom of expression and association.
U.S.: "[Limit] the scope of the obligations assumed under the convention to those
which would not restrict the right of free speech as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution
and those which would not restrict the right of free speech as guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution and laws of the United States."
West Gennany: "After careful consideration, [Gennany] has reached the conclusion
that dissemination of opinions of racial superiority should be punishable if it was
intended to create racial discrimination or hatred."
States having their own separate interpretations of the most far-reaching and controversial
clauses of the treaty would be consistent with realist expectations. However, at one point the
Secretary General intervened and drafted the "Model Law Against Racial Discrimination,"
clarifying what kind of laws states ought to have to be in compliance. 4 Since then, states
including Italy, New Zealand, Russia, South Africa, Croatia, and Spain are among countries
that have modified laws to be more in compliance with this interpretation of Article (4). Even
the U.S. Supreme Court, in the case Wisconsin vs. Mitchell, ruled that tougher sentencing for
racially motivated crimes is constitutional (Lerner 1996).
That the Secretary General had to step in and clarify the meaning of Article (4) is evidence
that the committee has not conclusively handled some of the more difficult issues on its own;
the positive reaction of states, though, is more than realists would predict. As far as the level
of commitment to the treaty is concerned, debate about Article (4), as well as different views
concerning the right to discriminate privately, has largely been unresolved. It is clear from
reservations and statements that states have their own interpretations, and while the committee
has also attempted to rule on these matters, states made sure before agreeing to the convention
that they would have an escape clause.

Hypothesis 3: Enforcement Conditional on State Involvement
The third hypothesis is that the strength of the enforcement mechanism would be
conditional on the involvement of state's parties. Thus, lCERD should have little power
independently. There is conflicting evidence that the committee is both relatively weak and
that it has expanded its powers and influence. A weak committee would be unable to coerce
states to comply with the treaty obligations.
According to Part II of the convention, a committee is to be composed of "eighteen
experts of high moral standing and acknowledged impartiality elected by States Parties
from among their nationals" (Article 8: I). Members of the committee do not serve as state
representatives but are nonetheless more closely associated with their states than other
committee IGOs; a given representative may only be nominated by his or her state because
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states cannot nominate other nationals. Also, ICERD specialists are compensated by their
respective states for services (Schwelb 1966, 1033). This would makc ICERD more subject
to state preferences and politics, arguably weakening the committce as a whole and allowing
states more power.
State's parties are required to submit a "report on the legislative, judicial, administrative
or other measures which they have adopted" (Article 9: I) within one year of entry into force
and then every two years; this gives the committee time to analyze reports and to request more
infonnation. Reporting is the main instrument for monitoring and enforcement.
Schwelb called reporting "a measure of implementation which is more acceptable to
governments than judicial proceedings and arrangements for the quasi-judicial settlement
of complaints. In certain contexts it has proved very useful and effective" (1966, 1034). In
its work, the committee as a whole cannot consider outside documents, though individuals
on the committee are not restricted in the kinds of information they may accumulate (Prado
1985,499).
The committee itself submits reports to the General Assembly. Some wanted the
committee strictly linked to state's parties, others wanted it to be a UN organ. Italy proposed a
compromise inherent in the treaty: principles in ICERD apply to all member states of the UN,
but the obligations are only binding on state's parties to convention (Prado 1985,498).
While realists may question the power of reporting, the committee has since been effective
and expansive with the reporting system. In the sixth session, the committee decided to invite
a representative of state's parties to defend and explain reports (Santa Cruz 1977, 37-9). In the
seventh session, the committee asked to know more about Article (4), which requires states
to make certain acts criminal offenses. The committee requested that states report on specific
laws that had been passed or on what laws already existed (Santa Cruz 1977,39). This shows
that ICERD has since actively engaged state's parties, probably realizing that states were not
certain about what to report on. In this way, ICERD can make recommendations on reporting
procedures, which then become standard for all state's parties. Also, ICERD has had states
report on matters of noncompliance.
Almost by default then, ICERD can interpret the convention and make additional
demands; State's parties mayor may not accept them, but because ICERD considers the
reports, it has some sway in how states are required to implement convention obligations
(Meron 1985, 285).
Success through reporting has been mixed. The committee asserted, "Legislation
in accordance with Article 2( I d) is mandatory for all States Parties regardless of their
circumstances." And while "discussions with the committee have been instrumental in the
enactment of specific legislation prohibiting racial discrimination by some sixty States Parties,
... some twenty-five States Parties maintain that no specific legislation on racial discrimination
is required under [this article 1because racial discrimination does not exist in their territories"
(Mahalic and Mahalic 1987, 85-8).
Realists also predict that the committee may become politicized and fragmented.
Schwelb admitted to this possibility, arguing that as an institution the committee may form
its own interests or become a forum for disagreement between factions. Mr. Dechezelles, a
particularly outspoken committee member nominated by France, illustrated this potential. Of
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a Belarusian report, he said "[I am] skeptical of statements claiming that in whole continents,
or at least in a very large area of the world, not a single case of racial discrimination had been
brought before the courts because racial discrimination had completely disappeared among
the population." Another committee member, Mr. Sviridov, later commented: "[racially
discriminatory] practices [do] not exist in socialist countries," adding that he, "could not
agree ... that racism was an inherent evil in every man" (Banton 1996, 124). This example
shows that a fractioned committee would likely give mixed signals to states' parties and
prevent an effective approach. Such disintegration is consistent with realist predictions,
though in light of the benefits to security, states may be more inclined to cooperate. Clearly,
the polarization of the international system is evident in this anecdote.
Another author stated contrarily in 1985 that ICERD based its actions more and more
on a group of formal guidelines (Prado, 507). While I have no evidence of this, I would
comfortably predict that with the spread of capitalism and democracy, states that formerly
denied the existence of racial discrimination would be more willing to work with the committee
to recognize and correct it.
In addition to reporting, the convention allows states to monitor one another and alert
ICERD to violations. Article (12) allows for an ad hoc Conciliation Commission composed of
five members. Appointed by "unanimous consent" of parties involved, this commission then
adopts its own rules. According to Article (13), the commission submits a report about the
facts and recommendations, then the committee chairman gives it to the states, and after three
months the states accept or decline. s The convention makes no other mention of this process,
which is not strong: these conciliatory commissions can issue nothing legally binding. This
conciliation process is consistent with realist predictions; a powerful process would result in a
legally binding, enforceable decision.
In summary, the second prediction of realists, that the treaty would be non-binding in
nature with weak enforcement features, is mostly consistent. The treaty has as its primary
instrument a reporting mechanism and has no capacity to issue binding disputes. As shown
above, the committee has not historically presented a unified face, though it may increasingly
do so in the future. Also, the biggest problem with reporting is when states either do not report
at all or take too long to submit reports (Prado 1985, 493). However, through the dialogue
allowed by the reporting process, the committee has effectively helped states pass more
meaningful and effective national laws against racial discrimination. In this regard, reporting
may be an influential tool. This principle seems to be in line with theories about soft power:
a committee to hold ~tates accountable even through just dialogue can bring about change. It
is also clear that while the committee members have disagreed, the work of the committee is
carried out largely without a great deal of outside influence. In this regard, ICERD may be
taking on a more independent role than realists would have predicted.

Hypothesis 4: Limited Success and Inability to Change Structures
The fourth and final hypothesis is that ICERD would not dramatically change either
internal or external affairs and its accomplishments would be limited.
Mahalic (1987, 101) stated, "It is noteworthy that the combined efforts of the committee
and States Parties ... have clarified misconceptions, fostered more consistent interpretations
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of the convention, and resulted in a greater degree of compliance with its provisions by a
majority of States Parties." Banton added to this positive assessment with two of the
committee's achievements: first, states have much better laws; and second, the committee is
now established, autonomous, and generally not political ( 1996, 8-10).
Concerning the potential efficacy of a then newly formed treaty, Heman Santa Cruz reported
that states have adopted a "great variety of measures," some legislative and some constitutional,
to pursue the ends of the treaty. He also gave an exhaustive list of various bans on discrimination
in many constitutions (1977,49). Cruz suggested that the treaty prompted a rush to bring national
laws against anti-discrimination in line with ICERD demands. In one way, the direct cause and
effect is irrelevant; a convention such as ICERD draws attention to a matter when states arc
challenged to sign and ratify. This is one way the UN and other international organizations
influence state behavior, somewhat like an interest group would lobby.
While ICERD may be effective, there are numerous examples of persistent, intense
discrimination in member states. Three examples of such discrimination follow:
I. Caste discrimination has arguably been one area of failure for ICERD and other UN
Human Rights bodies. There has been a failure to define, research, and actively pursue
policies against this; there is even debate about whether or not caste discrimination
qualifies as a form of racial discrimination. UN action is referred to as "a story of selective
perception, tepid reactions and token gestures" (The Hindu 200 I).
2. The Bangladeshi constitution declares that the state shall not discriminate against
any citizen on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth. Bangladesh is an
ICERD member; ICERD has ordered that the constitutional provision is not enough.
However, Bangladesh has yet to pass specific laws criminalizing discrimination, and
Bangladesh itself continues to discriminate. For example, the Jumma people do not
receive equal rations and have not received previously confiscated land back. This is a
case of discrimination against a group of indigenous people (Asian Centre for Human
Rights 2008).6
3. Japan has argued about the term "national origin" since 1946. It believes that the
term is nothing akin to race or ethnicity. Instead, "the term ... should mean the legal
nationality one had before migrating from one country to another, or before naturalizing
in a country in which one was born an alien" (Weatherall 2007).
Paul Roth of the University of Otago called the main method to encourage compliance
"naming and shaming." Roth reported a more positive case with New Zealand, when ICERD
expressed a number of concerns about a particular law and made recommendations, requesting
that New Zealand include an update in the next report. Roth congratulated ICERD for what he
called constructive dialogue, though he lamented some of the consequences of New Zealand
being called down. First, New Zealand had a nearly flawless human rights record. Second,
ICERD will be looking closely at New Zealand for the indefinite future. Third, other treaty
bodies will also look into the issue. New Zealand later reported on the implementation of the
law (ICERD 2007). For states like New Zealand, which cares about its human rights record,
the opinion of the international community matters, and this is an incentive to comply and
avoid scrutiny.
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Two references to expert opinions, one ofthem quite dated, and four anecdotes are mostly
inconclusive about the fourth hypothesis. ICERD has not drastically changed the structure
of the international system, though it appears that on the national level many states have
adjusted old laws and passed new ones in attempts to comply with the treaty. It is also clear
that discrimination will remain pertinent.

Conclusion
Article (55) of the UN Charter states that the UN is to work for "universal respect for, and
observance ot~ human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language or religion" (Banton 1996,21). The UN has taken that mandate to form ICERD,
to which many states are now a party. This paper has given four separate realist hypotheses
concerning an anti-discrimination convention and tested them, which test has produced mixed
results; some cases were more conclusive than others. ICERD seems to be a relatively weak
body, yet it has still influenced national laws and state actions. While full compliance to this
convention may never be attainable due to the nature of racial discrimination, it can be concluded
that ICERD has been at least partially successful in helping the UN fulfill its mandate without
distinction. Given the security implications involved, realist predictions are more accurate
than I would have expected. A more thorough study would likely include a detailed analysis of
reservations, national laws, and the evolution ofintemational attitudes towards minorities.
NOTES
I. Interestingly, this debate about the origins of authority surfaces in another form in the various views
defining human rights. The Soviet Union commonly held that there are no rights without a powerful
state, while the West claimed human rights exist independent of a state and can act against a state.
2.

The reservation lodged upon ratification also discusses article four, as well as the overall respect for
privacy that the constitution promises.

3.

Article (5) states that the rights of freedom and expression are to be granted without distinction.

4.

The draft law states: I) it shall be an offence to threaten, insult, ridicule or otherwise abuse a person
or group of persons with words or behavior that may be interpreted as an attempt to cause racial
discrimination or racial hatred, and 2) it shall be an offence to defame an individual or group of
individuals on racial grounds. Organizations that violate these restrictions should be declared illegal
and prohibited.

5.

Banton reports that no state has ever gone through this commission process. That may be because
most states resolve violations through negotiations.

6.

I have chosen not to include any in-depth discussion of the treatment of minorities or selt~determination
in this paper.
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